Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? [Dataset]

DOI

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling off. We also study the effect of subjects' degree of “cognitive reflection” on their behavior.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.11588/data/GPYRWB
Related Identifier https://doi.org/10.1628/093245615X14307212950056
Metadata Access https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_datacite&identifier=doi:10.11588/data/GPYRWB
Provenance
Creator Oechssler, Jörg; Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W.
Publisher heiDATA
Contributor Oechssler, Jörg; heiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository
Publication Year 2018
Rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
OpenAccess false
Contact Oechssler, Jörg (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics, Heidelberg University, Germany)
Representation
Resource Type Dataset
Format application/x-spss-syntax; text/tab-separated-values; application/pdf
Size 3787; 103482; 108959; 17825
Version 1.1
Discipline Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture; Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture and Veterinary Medicine; Life Sciences; Social Sciences; Social and Behavioural Sciences; Soil Sciences