Who is likely to engage in Anti-Russian boycotts in China? Existing literature on the subject focuses on ethnocentrism and nationalism as the main drivers of political consumerism in this context. Unlike past research, this article offers a unique insight into the possible causes of political boycotts that directly contradict the dominant discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Using original survey data, the authors demonstrate that there is a substantial minority in China willing to take part in anti-Russian boycotts. By focusing on political ideology, the article to identifies those who are most likely to express willingness to boycott Russian goods. To do this, two ideological dimensions– social authoritarianism and attitudes to economic organisation – are used to delineate three distinct ideological leanings in China: liberalism, the New Left and neo-authoritarianism. The article demonstrates that those with liberal leanings are more likely than others to support the boycott of Russian products. Additionally, it demonstrates that all three groups are more willing to boycott Russian goods if they hold egalitarian attitudes. The findings shed light on the causes of the anti-Russian sentiment in China and its likely implications for the new Sino-Russian partnership.Who is likely to engage in Anti-Russian boycotts in China? Existing literature on the subject focuses on ethnocentrism and nationalism as the main drivers of political consumerism in this context. Unlike past research, this article offers a unique insight into the possible causes of political boycotts that directly contradict the dominant discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Using original survey data, the authors demonstrate that there is a substantial minority in China willing to take part in anti-Russian boycotts. By focusing on political ideology, the article to identifies those who are most likely to express willingness to boycott Russian goods. To do this, two ideological dimensions– social authoritarianism and attitudes to economic organisation – are used to delineate three distinct ideological leanings in China: liberalism, the New Left and neo-authoritarianism. The article demonstrates that those with liberal leanings are more likely than others to support the boycott of Russian products. Additionally, it demonstrates that all three groups are more willing to boycott Russian goods if they hold egalitarian attitudes. The findings shed light on the causes of the anti-Russian sentiment in China and its likely implications for the new Sino-Russian partnership.

A representative sample of 3,039 Chinese citizens was interviewed between the 9th and 23rd of March 2022 using standardized electronic Computer Assisted Web Interviewing. The data was then weighted based first on the quotas of age and gender and then geographically, to reflect the distribution of the population across the many regions of China.