In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. The resulting article studies the interaction of incentive pay with intrinsic motivation and social distance. It analyses theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have not only pro-social objectives but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another.
A field experiment conducted across 151 villages in Karnataka, India, in the context of a government-subsidized health insurance scheme aimed at the rural poor. In a random subsample of the villages (the treatment groups), one local woman per village was recruited to spread information about the scheme. These ‘knowledge agents’ were randomly assigned to either a flat-pay or an incentive-pay contract. Under the latter contract, the agents' pay depended on how a random sample of eligible households in their village performed when surveyed and orally presented with a knowledge test about the scheme