Data resulting from an experiment analysing corporate tax avoidance in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting with homogenous products and symmetric firms and consumers. The experiment investigates how market concentration and information disclosure of firms’ tax avoidance behaviour could reduce corporate tax avoidance. Data show that making corporate tax behaviour more transparent by introducing a tax rating makes consumers actively and costly boycott firms that do not pay their taxes. Firms anticipate consumer boycotts and adapt their tax behaviour accordingly. The ESRC Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) undertakes interdisciplinary research into competition policy and regulation that has real-world policy relevance without compromising academic rigour. It prides itself on the interdisciplinary nature of the research and the members are drawn from a range of disciplines, including economics, law, business and political science. The Centre was established in September 2004, building on the pre-existing Centre for Competition and Regulation (CCR), with a grant from the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council). It currently boasts a total of 26 faculty members (including the Director and a Political Science Mentor), 4 full- and part-time researchers and 23 PhD students.

Laboratory experiment with 15440 observations of 386 participants. Each of the participants was exclusively assigned to one of eight treatments and made decisions for 20 periods. Participants either took the role of one of two firms that could set prices [0,100] or the role of two/four consumers that could buy up to five units of a homogenous product from either of the firms. In some treatments, firms in addition to setting prices could choose how many fees they wanted to avoid.