A collection of interviews and media about the ways that security concerns are constructed and 'taken care of' within the synthetic biology community. The interviews represent a sampling of the types of relationships the primary researcher, Sam Weiss Evans, worked with during the data collection process, including those with whom he interacted on only a few occasions, and those with whom he built a long-standing collaborative engagement relationship. The interviewees agreed to have their names released with the transcripts. The media are images, videos, reports, journal articles, and other items that have been a part of the conversation in synthetic biology about the construction and governance of its security concerns. These were collected over the length of the project through discussions I had with members of the community who were debating the (de-)merits of a particular article, video, etc. To build and maintain access to the community, I engaged in two exercises of embedding into different parts of the synthetic biology community. First, I spent four months at the beginning of 2014 at the central administration of the United States' National Science Foundation's funded Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (Synberc) at the University of California, Berkeley. I attended weekly administation meetings, presented at the Synberc retreat, and built a working relationship with the core set of researchers and administrators that made up this national research conglomeration. After that, I spent four months within the Massachusetts Inistute of Technology's Program on Emerging Technology, run by Professor Kenneth Oye. This Program has a very active stream of research focused on governance and security aspects of synthetic biology, and is tightly connected to the bioengineers and the policy world. I attended weekly lab meetings and contributed to the research projects being conducted, while also analyzing the process through which decisions were made about what did and did not deserve attention of the Program. Data analysis included a cross-referenced array of all sources to draw out similarities in the ways that areas of synthetic biology were constructed as being or not being matters of security concern. It is well established that policy agendas define and construct what counts as a concern (Majone 1989). Yet, what remains outside of professional and policy agendas is equally an issue of importance. 'Strategic surprise', for example, is a recurring hazard for those attending to the security implications of science and technology. Yet, why and how some topics are ignored are questions amenable to social sciences and humanities inquiry. This project seeks empirically and theoretically to assess what is not taking place in relation to the analysis of the implications of science for security. It will study what is not taking place in different case studies related to the potential for life science knowledge and techniques to serve destructive purposes. Through doing so, the project will consider how such cases can inform other studies of emerging areas of concern and how they can inform empirical social research in general. A number of questions that address themes of ethical blindness, taken for granted assumptions, and the social basis of assessments will be central to this project, including: * How, for who, between whom, and under what circumstances have some applications of science become rendered non-issues? * What are the everyday routines, practices, social structures that shape this process? * How have scientists, diplomats, security analysts, and others fostered attention to or distanced themselves from applications of their work? In relation to Global Uncertainties Programme's goals, this project asks how a diverse range of expertise can be brought together in a systematic fashion to address practical dilemmas associated with openness and collaboration in science. Consideration will be given to how perceptions of and its implications for defence and security vary across professional communities, regulatory regimes, and national contexts. The specific concern with the hostile application of the life sciences examined through the interdisciplinary programme of inquiry outlined in this application will serve as a springboard for addressing what is left outside professional and policy agendas. The ultimate impact anticipated from this project -- as also demonstrated by the activities set out in the 'Pathways to Impact' section -- is to support efforts to prevent the malign use of life sciences and, thus, ensuring work to improve human security.

The interviews and documents collected here are a part of a wider research project studying the construction of security concerns in synthetic biology. While some data was amiable to collection through interview formats, a significant portion was more appropriately collected through long-term observation and integration into the synthetic biology community. The interviews represent a sampling of the types of relationships the primary researcher, Sam Weiss Evans, worked with during the data collection process, including those with whom he interacted on only a few occasions, and those with whom he built a long-standing collaborative engagement relationship. The interviewees agreed to have their names released with the transcripts. The media are images, videos, reports, journal articles, and other items that have been a part of the conversation in synthetic biology about the construction and governance of its security concerns. These were collected over the length of the project through discussions I had with members of the community who were debating the (de-)merits of a particular article, video, etc. To build and maintain access to the community, I engaged in two exercises of embedding into different parts of the synthetic biology community. First, I spent four months at the beginning of 2014 at the central administration of the United States' National Science Foundation's funded Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (Synberc) at the University of California, Berkeley. I attended weekly administation meetings, presented at the Synberc retreat, and built a working relationship with the core set of researchers and administrators that made up this national research conglomeration. After that, I spent four months within the Massachusetts Inistute of Technology's Program on Emerging Technology, run by Professor Kenneth Oye. This Program has a very active stream of research focused on governance and security aspects of synthetic biology, and is tightly connected to the bioengineers and the policy world. I attended weekly lab meetings and contributed to the research projects being conducted, while also analyzing the process through which decisions were made about what did and did not deserve attention of the Program. Data analysis included a cross-referenced array of all sources to draw out similarities in the ways that areas of synthetic biology were constructed as being or not being matters of security concern.