These data include three nationally representative internet panel surveys conducted in Greece (n=3071), Germany (n=2074) and the UK (n=2106) between 24 and 31 May 2019. There is only one wave. The questionnaire is the same in all three countries. It covered a variety of issues including attitudes towards the European Union, vote in a potential European Union referendum, European identity, political trust, political responsibility, European solidarity and freedom of movement. It also asked questions that tap into psychological processes, including emotions about the European Union/immigration/economy/how things are going, social dominance orientation and system justification. The surveys also include various demographic measures.The outbreak of the financial crisis has signalled a new period in the process of European integration. It has -more than ever before- brought to the forefront issues of transnational economic redistribution and has increased political contestation in and about the European Union (EU). Contrary to the pre-crisis era when Euroscepticism was mostly an expression of public protest limited to parties in the margins of their political systems, it has now developed into a widespread phenomenon with far-reaching implications for democracy in the EU and its members. However, we know surprisingly little about the nature of politicisation of European integration and the ways in which the structure of political conflict has changed as a result of the crisis. Seeking to build on the literature examining democratic contestation and the politicisation of European integration, and to contribute towards an improved understanding of the nature of Euroscepticism in times of crisis, this project offers an original contribution to the study of Euroscepticism by integrating three research objectives, which aim at (1) mapping and identifying the different dimensions of Euroscepticism and understanding whether these have changed as a result of the crisis; (2) exploring the underlying causes of Euroscepticism and explaining variation in levels of Euroscepticism at the country, party and individual levels; and (3) assessing the ways in which Euroscepticism feeds back into national politics by testing its consequences on domestic political behaviour. In answering these questions, this project relies on a novel interdisciplinary longitudinal and comparative research design and applies an original multi-method approach through the complementary use of quantitative and experimental methods. The project will examine the dimensions and causes of Euroscepticism through an analysis of cross-sectional and time series data in all EU member states. The longitudinal design enables us to compare Euroscepticism in the periods prior to and during the crisis. The project will study the consequences of Euroscepticism on domestic political behaviour by focusing on three countries, namely Britain, Germany and Greece, which are non-Eurozone members, creditor and debtor countries, respectively. Building on my work on Euroscepticism, this study makes a significant theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution to our understanding of the politics of opposition in Europe and the literature on the EU's democratic deficit. The project's findings will provide evidence-based knowledge about elite and citizen attitudes towards European integration, allowing for effective policy responses to the rise of Eurosceptic sentiment across Europe. The three-year length of the project (2016-2018) will enable me to become a research leader at the forefront of political analysis, linking the project's findings to the debate over the possible 2017 referendum on British EU membership, the possibility of Greek exit and the upcoming 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections. Through its insights on the changing nature of Euroscepticism, the project has the potential to stir debate regarding institutional reform, accountability and representation in the EU. An advisory board consisting of academics and policy-makers will be consulted through the duration of the project. In order to ensure the co-production of knowledge with relevant policy communities, I have established official partnership with two think tanks, the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the London-based Policy Network. Research outputs will include dissemination to practitioners and the wider public through three policy-related workshops, executive summaries, policy publications, media articles and a dedicated project website; and academic dissemination through conference participation, journal articles and a monograph.

Three public opinion surveys were conducted in Greece, Germany and the UK with adults aged over 18. These were online surveys conducted by market research companies which were Kiescompass in Greece, and YouGov in the UK and Germany. The survey questions were the same in each country. The sample included 3091 individuals from Greece, 2074 individuals from Germany, and 2106 individuals from the UK.