Laboratory Experiment on a New Version of Boudon's Game-Theoretic Model of Relative Deprivation

Background: Improvements in the upward social mobility of a group or society can paradoxically lead to more frustration (relative deprivation) among its members. At present, there is little understanding of the conditions under which this paradox occurs. Raymond Boudon created a game-theoretic model of relative deprivation that can be used to derive predictions for these conditions. We extend his model, and test it in a laboratory experiment.

The Experiment: 144 subjects participated in one of 7 sessions conducted in the winter of 2017/2018. They were randomly placed in an individual cubicle, so they could not see, or communicate with, each other. Through written instructions, they were informed that they would play a competition game in groups of six. They were also informed that there were six rounds of the competition game in total, and that the groups would be randomly reassigned every round. The game is as follows. In every round, there are a number of rewards to be allocated among the group. Subjects receive a budget that they can invest to participate in a competition for these rewards, or they can keep it and not participate in the competition. The rewards are first allocated to the persons who participated in the competition. If in a round the number of investors exactly equals the number of rewards, all investors will get a reward minus their invested budget, and all persons that did not participate in the competition (the non-investors) do not get a reward but keep their budget. If there are more investors than rewards, not every investor can get a reward. The rewards will then be randomly allocated over the investors. The rest of the investors will not receive a reward, despite having spent their budget to participate in the competition. Boudon suggested that these losing investors are disadvantaged compared to some of their referent others, namely the winning investors, and can therefore be considered relatively deprived. If there are fewer investors than rewards, there will be rewards left after all investors have received a reward. In Boudon's original model, these excess rewards are unallocated. In our version of the model, a random selection of non-investors will be randomly chosen to get one of the excess rewards, despite having kept their budget. After all subjects make their decision in a round, the rewards are allocated and the subjects informed on the outcomes for themselves and the decisions and outcomes for their group members. Interpersonal comparisons between these outcomes can lead to relative deprivation. Increases in social mobility within a group can lead to more frustration among its members when the increase benefits some more than others, causing the persons that do not benefit (as much) to feel relatively deprived.

Measures Besides the investment decision, subjects were asked to rate their feelings of anger, sadness, satisfaction, and unfairness about their outcome after every round. They were also asked to rate their satisfaction with their outcome compared to each possible reference group (investors with a reward, non-investors without a reward, etc.). At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to provide information on their age, gender, native language, participation in prior experiments, field of study/work, income, life satisfaction, risk aversion, trust, altruism, and positive and negative reciprocity. Information on these measures can be found in the codebook.

This dataset contains the original ztree files, the data in stata (DTA) and spss (SAV, and POR) formats, a codebook, and documentation on the experimental methods.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xjw-449u
PID https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-4j-j3j7
Metadata Access https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_datacite&identifier=oai:easy.dans.knaw.nl:easy-dataset:115391
Provenance
Creator Otten, K.
Publisher Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS)
Contributor Weesie, J.; Corten, R.
Publication Year 2019
Rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess; License: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0; http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
OpenAccess true
Representation
Language English
Resource Type Dataset
Format DTA; SAV; POR; PDF; TXT; Ztree
Discipline Other
Spatial Coverage Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics (ELSE); Utrecht; The Netherlands