Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable [Dataset]

DOI

We study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipi- ent, leading to favoritism in outcomes. We study four interventions to reduce favoritism and induce fair procedures, without restricting the allocator’s decisions: transparency of the allocation process; a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information about recipients. Making use of beliefs and fairness judgments, we show why some interventions work, while others do not.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.11588/data/APBF7C
Related Identifier https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab019
Metadata Access https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_datacite&identifier=doi:10.11588/data/APBF7C
Provenance
Creator Schmidt, Robert (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics, Heidelberg University, Deutsche Bundesbank); Trautmann, Stefan T. (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics, Heidelberg University; Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
Publisher heiDATA
Contributor Trautmann, Stefan T.; heiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository
Publication Year 2021
Rights Licensed under a <a href='http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/'>Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. &#160;<img src='https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/80x15.png' alt='CC by' /></a>; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
OpenAccess true
Contact Trautmann, Stefan T. (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics, Heidelberg University)
Representation
Resource Type Dataset
Format text/plain; text/tab-separated-values; application/x-stata-syntax; application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
Size 89176; 74133; 96372; 145277; 159974; 112537; 126245; 1206; 699850; 491425; 461602; 82680; 82716; 38249; 134395; 14923
Version 1.1
Discipline Social Sciences