Experimental data for: Why Bargainers with Many Resources in Coalition Formation Ask Too Much

DOI

This data package contains (meta) data, analysis scripts, and relevant documents for the project: Why Bargainers with Many Resources in Coalition Formation Ask Too Much

The research pits two explanations for the use of proportional allocation rules by strong bargainers in coalition formation against each other: 1) a myopic focus on proportional allocation rules 2) strategic application of proportional allocation rules.

Identifier
DOI https://doi.org/10.34894/7F3ZNY
Metadata Access https://dataverse.nl/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_datacite&identifier=doi:10.34894/7F3ZNY
Provenance
Creator Wissink, Joeri ORCID logo; van Beest, Ilja (ORCID: 0000-0003-2855-3638 ); Pronk, Tila; van de Ven, Niels (ORCID: 0000-0002-6730-9200 )
Publisher DataverseNL
Contributor Wissink, Joeri; DataverseNL
Publication Year 2018
Rights CC0 Waiver; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess; https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
OpenAccess true
Contact Wissink, Joeri (Tilburg University)
Representation
Resource Type Miscellaneous data; Dataset
Format application/pdf; application/zip
Size 246674; 4054997
Version 1.0
Discipline Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture; Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Aquaculture and Veterinary Medicine; Life Sciences; Social Sciences; Social and Behavioural Sciences; Soil Sciences